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13. AIRR data under the EU Trade 
Secrets Directive: aligning scientific 
practices with commercial realities1 
Jacob S. Sherkow and Timo Minssen
1. INTRODUCTION
Next generation, high throughput DNA sequencing (‘HTS’) has led to an 
explosion of genetic data.2 Today’s HTS projects often yield hundreds of mil-
lions of reads of DNA, constituting terabytes of data—a large enough amount 
that storage, access, and computing power become significant constraints.3 
Because such data often contains medically sensitive information, safeguard-
ing it has become an important object for privacy regulations.4 But keeping 
vast troves of genetic data secret may also be important for commercial 
applications—to maintain intellectual property rights in their use.5 Whether 
1 This work was generously supported by a New York Law School Summer Research 
Grant. Timo Minssen’s research for this chapter was supported by a Novo Nordisk 
Foundation grant for a scientifically independent Collaborative Research Programme 
in Biomedical Innovation Law (grant agreement number NNF17SA0027784).
2 Matthew B Scholz, Chien-Chi Lo and Patrick SG Chain, “Next Generation 
Sequencing and Bioinformatic Bottlenecks: The Current State of Metagenomic Data 
Analysis” (2012) 23 Curr Opinion Biotech 9.
3 Sebastian Wandelt and others, “Data Management Challenges in Next Generation 
Sequencing” (2012) 12 Datenbank-Spektrum 161; Paul Muir and others, “The Real 
Cost of Sequencing: Scaling Computation to Keep Pace with Data Generation” (2016) 
17 Genome Biol 53.
4 Isabelle Budin-Ljøsne and others, “ELSI Challenges and Strategies of National 
Biobank Infrastructures” (2012) 21 Norsk Epidemiologi 155; Charles Auffray and 
others, “Making Sense of Big Data in Health Research: Towards an EU Action Plan” 
(2016) 8 Genome Med 71; Bartha Maria Knoppers and Adrian Mark Thorogood, 
“Ethics and Big Data in Health” (2017) 4 Curr Opinion Sys Biol 53. 
5 Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan and Stephen J McCormack, “Patents, Secrecy, and 
DNA” (2001) 293 Science 217 (“The intellectual property regime for DNA sequences 
is trade secrecy when data are most valuable, followed by government-enforced 
monopoly rights for the duration of a patent’s term”). See also Robert Cook-Deegan 
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such data constitute trade secrets under the EU Trade Secrets Directive,6 and 
under what terms, is an issue of critical importance to European researchers 
and businesses.
This chapter explores the application of the EU Trade Secrets Directive 
for a new iteration of HTS technology: Adaptive immune receptor repertoire 
sequencing, or “AIRR-seq.” AIRR-seq uses HTS technologies to sequence 
substantial portions of cells constituting the human immune system, some-
times referred to as the “immunome.”7 This can be more data intensive than 
using HTS for cells outside the immunome, because human immune cells 
display substantial genetic variability.8 Indeed, this variability is a function 
of how the immune system adapts to new infections: By producing a large 
number of different immune receptors, the immune system can better select 
for cells expressing immune receptors that target foreign molecules, thereby 
adapting to novel infections.9 The genetic diversity of these adaptive immune 
receptors is immense: As many as 100 billion different immune receptors can 
be coded into the genes of just one type of immune receptor.10 Protecting such 
large and complex datasets as trade secrets under the new Directive presents 
some significant challenges.
Nonetheless, trade secrecy is likely to be important for AIRR-seq data 
because it can be commercially valuable. Ascertaining the genetic sequences 
of specific immune receptors marshaled to combat new infections is important 
and others, “The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing: Clinical Data as Trade Secrets?” 
(2013) 21 Euro J Human Genetics 585 (providing a robust ethical critique of the 
practice).
6 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information 
(Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure [2016] OJ 
L157/1 (EU Trade Secrets Directive).
7 Felix Breden and others, “Reproducibility and Reuse of Adaptive Immune 
Receptor Repertoire Data” (2017) 8 Frontiers Immunol 1; Anne S De Groot, 
“Immunomics: Discovering New Targets for Vaccines and Therapeutics” (2006) 11 
Drug Discovery Today 203.
8 Breden and others (n 7) 2.
9 Max D Cooper and Matthew N Alder, “The Evolution of Adaptive Immune 
Systems” (2006) 124 Cell 815.
10 Jacob Glanville and others, “Precise Determination of the Diversity of 
a Combinatorial Antibody Library Gives Insight into the Human Immunoglobulin 
Repertoire” (2009) 106 Proc Nat Aca Sci USA 20216.
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to the development of new biologic drugs, genetic diagnostics, and vaccines.11 
Other forms of intellectual property protection are less than optimal.12
Secrecy, however, presents problems for AIRR-seq data. Much of the 
AIRR-seq work currently conducted in Europe and elsewhere is mediated 
through academic laboratories that often share data through open protocols.13 
Open sharing allows others researchers to validate AIRR-seq data against 
standard reagents and protocols.14 It also allows researchers to annotate the 
data in useful ways, such as identifying paired “chains” of immune receptors 
and noting which immune receptors seem specific to which foreign molecules, 
or “antigens.”15 Open sharing of AIRR-seq data is also the preferred—though 
not exclusive—disclosure norm of the AIRR Community (an international 
community of AIRR researchers), and a default provision of MiAIRR, the data 
standard for AIRR-seq data.16 Beyond these scientifically important drivers 
for open sharing of AIRR-seq data, there are utilitarian and normative ones, 
too. Sharing AIRR-seq data helps researchers publish their results in scientific 
journals, demonstrate the superiority of their sequencing methods, and raise 
their status among their peers.17 The open sharing of AIRR-seq data also better 
aligns with many researchers’ expectations of Mertonian science and their 
feelings of responsibility to the grant funding public.18 For many researchers, 
the open sharing of AIRR-seq data is both a practice and a norm.
Yet open sharing destroys any trade secrecy in the underlying data. The 
EU Trade Secrets Directive defines trade secrets as any information that “has 
commercial value because it is secret” and “has been subject to reasonable 
steps … to keep it secret.”19 Information disclosed to others “within the circles 
that normally deal with the kind of information in question” is not protectable 
as a trade secret.20 While Member States have some leeway to craft safeguards 
to harsh implementations of the Directive, it does not appear that they have 
11 William H Robinson, “Sequencing the Functional Antibody Repertoire—
Diagnostic and Therapeutic Discovery” (2015) 11 Nat Rev Rheumatology 171, 178–9.
12 De Groot (n 7) 203; Jacob S Sherkow and Christopher Scott, “Myriad Stands 
Alone” (2014) 32 Nat Biotech 620.
13 Breden and others (n 7) 2; Florian Rubelt and others, “Adaptive Immune 
Receptor Repertoire Community Recommendations for Sharing Immune-Repertoire 
Sequencing Data” (2017) 18 Nat Immunology 1274.
14 Rubelt and others (n 13) 1275.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Breden and others (n 7) 2; Rubelt and others (n 13) 1275.
18 Robert K Merton, The Sociology of Science (U Chi Press 1973); Breden and 
others (n 7) 3–4.
19 EU Trade Secrets Directive, art 2.
20 Ibid.
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authority to carve out exceptions to the Directive’s definitions of secrecy.21 
Academic AIRR-seq research and the commercial development of products 
arising from that research therefore exist in tension: AIRR-seq data shared in 
the normal course of research may consequently stymie the development of 
therapies or vaccines based on that data.
At the same time, the nature of AIRR-seq data itself suggests several paths 
forward for maintaining the protectability of some aspects of that data under the 
Directive, even if otherwise disclosed. First, one of the most significant chal-
lenges in interpreting AIRR-seq data is the pairing of immune receptor chains, 
the individual components that constitute a complete immune receptor.22 This 
information—which chains form a unique immune receptor—may not be 
readily apparent from raw AIRR-seq data itself and, if kept secret, should be 
separately protectable under the Directive.23 Second, the antigen specificity of 
immune receptors—what the receptors bind to—is not readily apparent from 
AIRR-seq data itself.24 This information is critically important for commercial 
developers seeking to create products and diagnostics from AIRR-seq data;25 
it too should be separately protectable under the Directive.26 And third, the 
disclosure of broad AIRR-seq data should not obviate trade secret protection 
for modified, or recombinant, forms of immune receptor sequences.27 Those 
sequences, often identified through laborious experimentation, should be sepa-
rately protectable independent of how and how much related AIRR-seq data is 
disclosed.28 This is all to say that information derived from complex, publicly 
disclosed information—what we term “follow-on information”—should none-
theless be protected under the Trade Secrets Directive. Allowing such infor-
mation to be protectable, even where underlying raw sequences are otherwise 
publicly disclosed, would also have the salutary effect of further encouraging 
the disclosure of basic scientific information, rather than leaving researchers 
guessing as to the downstream effects of data sharing.
Beyond this practical assessment of protecting follow-on data, AIRR-seq 
projects present the occasion to think about how the Trade Secrets Directive 
aligns with commercial development, science, and disclosure more generally. 
21 Ibid, art 13.
22 Brandon J DeKosky and others, “High-Throughput Sequencing of the Paired 
Human Immunoglobulin Heavy and Light Chain Repertoire” (2013) 31 Nat Biotech 
166.
23 Text at n 127–47.
24 Robert A Holt, “Interpreting the T-cell Receptor Repertoire” (2017) 35 Nat 
Biotech 829.
25 Robinson (n 11) 178–9.
26 Text at n 145–55.
27 Text at n 154–64.
28 Ibid.
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First, AIRR-seq presents a case study of the mutual exclusivity of patents 
and trade secrets for complex technologies that may be informative for future 
policymakers. It also provides some conceptual guidance about which aspects 
of clinical trial data—some of the most valuable information in biopharma-
ceutical development—should be disclosed and which should be afforded 
protection. Lastly, trade secrets for follow-on AIRR-seq may provide ways 
of reorienting trade secrecy around genetic diagnostics. AIRR-seq data shows 
that it is at least theoretically possible to simultaneously promote information 
sharing while reserving the most value for aspects of that information to 
encourage private development of new technologies.
Against this backdrop, Section 2 of this chapter explains the particulars of 
AIRR-seq data. Section 3 reviews and describes the most important provisions 
of the EU Trade Secrets Directive for AIRR-seq data. Section 4 then discusses 
some difficulties arising from the sharing of AIRR-seq data under the Trade 
Secrets Directive and proposes several solutions. Section 5 uses AIRR-seq 
data sharing under the Trade Secrets Directive to better understand other prob-
lems related to information disclosure versus sharing.
2. AIRR DATA
AIRR sequencing—short for Adaptive Immune Receptor Repertoire 
sequencing—is one of the more fascinating and powerful applications of HTS 
to date.29 AIRR-seq data comes from the sequencing of a large number of cells 
of the immune system, large enough that a sequencing sample constitutes an 
approximate repertoire of that cell type for that particular organism.30 This 
is important because, in contrast to other cell types, many immune system 
cells are genetically heterogeneous; they each contain different sequences 
of immune receptor genes.31 Sequencing the repertoire of these cells allows 
researchers to follow the immune system as it adapts to an infection or some 
other immunological insult.32 This allows researchers to understand how the 
29 Breden and others (n 7) 1; Rubelt and others (n 13) 1275; Robinson (n 11) 171.
30 J Douglas Freeman and others, “Profiling the T-cell Receptor Beta-Chain 
Repertoire by Massively Parallel Sequencing” (2009) 19 Genome Res 1817; Harlan S 
Robins and others, “Comprehensive Assessment of T-cell Receptor β-chain diversity in 
αβ T Cells” (2009) 114 Blood 4099; Joshua A Weinstein and others, “High-Throughput 
Sequencing of the Zebrafish Antibody Repertoire” (2009) 324 Science 807; Breden and 
others (n 7) 1.
31 Breden and others (n 7) 2.
32 Ibid.
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immune system works, generally, and develop immune receptors with com-
mercial applications, such as vaccines and biologic drugs.33
2.1 The Adaptive Immune System
Humans and many other vertebrates possess two forms of biologic immu-
nity: Innate, immune responses that we are born with, and adaptive, immune 
responses created to combat infections and foreign material.34 Broadly speak-
ing, these immune responses work through complex networks of cellular 
signaling.35 Some cells, upon recognizing foreign material in the lymph, will 
use a series of molecular signals to cue other cells to destroy them.36
Two cell types are particularly critical to this signaling function: B cells, 
which mature in bone marrow, and T cells, which mature in the thymus 
gland.37 Each produces specialized proteins that reside on the cell surface and 
bind to foreign material or “antigens”:38 B cells produce antibodies and T cells 
produce T cell receptors; collectively they are “immune receptors.”39 At their 
tips, antibodies and T cell receptors have remarkably diverse and intricate 
structures, known as complementary determining regions (‘CDRs’), responsi-
ble for interacting with and binding to foreign antigens.40 Astonishingly, each 
new B cell and T cell produces a new immune receptor with different CDRs.41 
This creates a cosmic diversity of immune receptors—approximately 100 
billion different human antibodies are possible, for example.42
Astonishingly, the system has the capacity to develop immune receptors 
specific to virtually any foreign antigen.43 But because the human genome 
comprises only 19,000 genes, such diversity must come from something other 
than a 1:1 relationship between gene and immune receptor.44 The immune 
system achieves this by segmenting the genes required to produce immune 
33 Robinson (n 11) 178–9.
34 Weinstein and others (n 30) 807.
35 Cooper and Alder (n 9) 815. See also William E Paul, Fundamental Immunology 





40 Paul (n 35) 134.
41 Robins et al (n 30) 4099.
42 Glanville et al (n 10) 20216. See also Robins et al (n 30) 4099 (estimating ten 
quadrillion possible combinations).
43 Cooper and Alder (n 9) 815.
44 Susumu Tonegawa, “Somatic Generation of Antibody Diversity” (1983) 302 
Nature 575.
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receptors—namely, into variable or “V,” diversity or “D,” joining or “J,” and 
constant or “C” segments—and then expanding each segment into variable 
cassettes—V1, V2, and V3, for example.45 During the cellular maturation 
process, B and T cells randomly select a single cassette for each immune 
receptor gene segment, permanently editing the cellular genome in the pro-
cess.46 This resulting immune receptor gene then undergoes further changes 
through a process known as somatic hypermutation, which is then often further 
refined if the resulting immune receptor pairs with a foreign antigen.47 
The hundreds of millions B and T cells circulating in the lymph at any 
given time consequently have different genetic sequences.48 Examining these 
sequences as a whole has the potential to reveal much about to whom they 
belong, which immunities they have developed, which infections they are cur-
rently combating, the geography of where they have been and grew up, their 
ancestry, and so on.49 But understanding these sequences across a large scale 
of subjects also informs immunologists about how the immune system works 
generally, and about how to best engineer the immune system, both to respond 
to target antigens—as with vaccines—and to create therapeutically effective 
antibodies and T cell receptors.50
2.2 AIRR Sequencing
An AIRR sequencing project will begin by obtaining a large number of 
immune cells, most often through the blood.51 Particular cells of interest, 
such as certain types of B or T cells, can then be isolated using a variety of 
techniques.52 Once immune cells of interest have been isolated, they can then 
45 Ibid 576.
46 Ibid.
47 Deborah L French, Reuven Laskov and Matthew D Scharff, “The Role of 
Somatic Hypermutation in the Generation of Antibody Diversity” (1989) 244 Science 
1152.
48 Glanville and others (n 10) 20216.
49 Harlan Robins, “Immunosequencing: Applications of Immune Repertoire Deep 
Sequencing” (2013) 25 Curr Op Immunology 646; Poornima Parameswaran and others, 
“Convergent Antibody Signatures in Human Dengue” (2013) 13 Cell and Host Microbe 
691; George Georgiou and others, “The Promise and Challenge of High-Throughput 
Sequencing of the Antibody Repertoire” (2014) 32 Nat Biotech 158; Jacob Glanville 
and others, “Identifying Specificity Groups in the T cell Receptor Repertoire” (2017) 
547 Nature 94.
50 Georgiou and others (n 49) 160.
51 Elisa Rosati and others, “Overview of Methodologies for T-cell Receptor 
Repertoire Analysis” (2017) 17 BMC Biotech 1, 4.
52 Ibid 8. Obtaining enough cells to ensure that a large portion of the immune reper-
toire will be sequenced, not just a fraction of it, remains challenging. Joseph Kaplinsky 
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be prepared for genetic sequencing. Prior to the advent of HTS, this was 
a laborious and time intensive process that greatly limited the number of cells 
that could be sequenced—and as a consequence, the fraction of the immune 
repertoire that could be identified.53 HTS has since allowed researchers to 
sequence “tens to hundreds of millions of receptor sequences” in a single 
“run,” including multiple sequences—or “reads”—from a single gene.54 This 
redundancy best ensures both accurate and complete sequences from the 
derived immune cells.55
Today, HTS sequencing of immune receptor genes is typically accom-
plished in several ways, with cell barcoding and droplet sequencing consti-
tuting two of the more significant techniques. For cell barcoding, researchers 
separate each cell into individual wells containing unique, short fragments 
of DNA specific to that well—a DNA “barcode”—that can later be used to 
identify which cell any given sequence originated from.56 This barcode is 
then affixed to copies of cloned DNA (“cDNA”) from the cell and the entire 
genetic fragment—barcode plus cDNA—is then sequenced.57 For droplet 
sequencing, also known as “Drop-seq,” each immune cell is suspended in an 
emulsion droplet—essentially, a droplet of oil—containing a microscopic bead 
that binds to cDNA.58 Once inside the droplet, the cell is lysed, and the bead 
binds to DNA.59 During sequencing, each bead–DNA conjugate is sequenced, 
collating the sequences pertaining to each bead as coming from a unique 
cell.60 These technologies have numerous advantages over their predecessors: 
Sequencing can be run in parallel, with multiple DNA segments sequenced 
and Ramy Arnaout, “Robust Estimates of Overall Immune-Repertoire Diversity from 
High-Throughput Measurements on Samples” (2016) 7 Nat Communications 11881, 
8. Nonetheless, procedures such as leukapheresis—the removal of large numbers of 
subject’s white blood cells from whole blood—have been shown to be both safe and 
powerful enough to encompass the immune receptor repertoire. Peggy A English and 
others, “The Safety and Utility of Leukapheresis of Normal Donors for Obtaining 
Products for Immunologic Research” (1990) 135 J Immunological Meth 285.
53 Robinson (n 11) 171.
54 Rubelt and others (n 13) 1274.
55 Robins (n 48) 649.
56 Christopher Vollmers and others, “Genetic Measurement of Memory B-cell 
Recall Using Antibody Repertoire Sequencing” (2013) 110 Proc Nat Aca Sci USA 
13463.
57 Ibid.
58 Simon Friedensohn, Tarik A Khan, and Sai T Reddy, “Advanced Methodologies 
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simultaneously;61 even in large sequencing runs, they have the ability to iden-
tify which DNA sequences came from which cells;62 and for immune recep-
tors, specifically, these technologies can be easily modified to ensure that the 
entire CDR of an immune receptor—not just a single chain—is sequenced.63
There are limitations to these technologies, to be sure. The same process that 
gives rise to immune receptors’ great variability also confounds easy sequenc-
ing: AIRR researchers often use reference gene data—IMGT is a popular 
database—to validate their findings.64 But gaps in reference databases, or thin 
data, make finding new immune receptor variants that much more difficult.65 
In other cases, it is simply too difficult to ensure that the entirety of an immune 
receptor’s CDR is sequenced; researchers may only be able to obtain a single 
chain, for example.66 In addition, despite recent advances in barcoding and 
droplet sequencing, there remain latent errors in the sequencing process itself.67
Nonetheless, AIRR data is a remarkably precise instrument for determining 
how the immune system responds and evolves to infections.68 When coupled 
with clinical data—information about patients’ infections and how they have 
responded—AIRR researchers can use their data to develop powerful tools for 
the treatment of disease.69 A recent study, for example, examined the immune 
repertoire of patients suffering from a particular type of cancer, cutaneous T 
cell lymphoma.70 Often, it is unclear whether a patient truly has lymphoma or 
if it is instead a benign skin disease.71 Immune receptor repertoire sequenc-
ing, however, was able to correctly predict true lymphomas in 46/46—100 
percent—of patients,72 divined from a sea of hundreds of millions of strings of 
61 Freeman and others (n 30) 1817.
62 Friedensohn, Khan, and Reddy (n 58) 210.
63 Dekosky and others (n 22) 166.
64 Shuo Li and others, “IMGT/HighV QUEST Paradigm for T cell Receptor IMGT 
Clonotype Diversity and Next Generation Repertoire Immunoprofiling” (2013) 4 Nat 
Communications 2333.
65 Corey T Watson and Felix Breden, “The Immunoglobulin Heavy Chain Locus: 
Genetic Variation, Missing Data, and Implications for Human Disease” (2012) 13 
Genes Immunity 363.
66 Georgiou and others (n 49) 158.
67 Nicolas Fischer, “Sequencing Antibody Repertoires: The Next Generation” 
(2011) 3 mAbs 17.
68 Xueling Wu and others, “Focused Evolution of HIV-1 Neutralizing Antibodies 
Revealed by Structures and Deep Sequencing” (2011) 333 Science 1593.
69 Ilan R Kirsch and others, “TCR Sequencing Facilitates Diagnosis and Identifies 
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DNA sequences.73 AIRR sequencing is a triumph of HTS and “big data” tech-
nologies, and heralds the possibility of both understanding and manipulating 
the immune system in granular detail.
2.3 AIRR Data
Data underlying AIRR-seq projects come in a variety of forms. There are the 
raw, genomic sequences themselves, spanning the entirety of the cassette that 
gives rise to each chain of the cell’s antibody or T cell receptor.74 Similarly, 
there are the complete, raw sequences of each cell’s immune receptor’s 
mRNA, the intermediate precursor from DNA to producing the immune 
receptor itself.75 For any given AIRR experiment from a single subject, these 
can come from hundreds of thousands or millions of cells, producing the raw 
sequences of millions of chains of immune receptors.76 
This raw sequence data can be valuable in and of itself. Bioinformatics soft-
ware allows AIRR researchers not involved in the principal sequencing efforts 
to infer which V, D, and J genes contributed to producing each cell’s immune 
receptor, and even to infer new genes not yet known in databases, such as 
IMGT.77 Others can make use of the data to “pair” immune receptor chains 
together that were not originally paired when sequenced.78 This is crucial, for 
example, in the development of antibody-based therapies that typically require 
the paired sequences of both an antibody’s heavy and its light chains.79
Beyond the raw sequence itself, information concerning sequences’ func-
tional properties, such as what each component of the immune receptor is 
likely to bind to, can also be valuable. While the field is still nascent, some 
researchers are attempting to derive information from raw sequences to 
predict immune receptors’ likely targets.80 Databases such as Epitome contain 
73 Ibid.
74 Rubelt and others (n 13) 1275.
75 Ibid 1276.
76 Ibid 1274.
77 Scott D Boyd and others, “Individual Variation in the Germline Ig Gene 
Repertoire Inferred from Variable Region Gene Rearrangements” (2010) 184 J 
Immunol 6986; Watson and Breden (n 65) 363; Dekosky et al (n 22) 166.
78 Dekosky and others (n 22) 166.
79 James S Blachy and others, “Immunoglobulin Transcript Sequence and Somatic 
Hypermutation Computation from Unselected RNA-seq Reads in Chronic Lymphocytic 
Leukemia” (2015) 112 Proc Nat’l Aca Sci USA 4322, 4325 (“[R]econstruction of the 
entire V-D-J sequence and thus definition of the complete CDR3 is important to study 
BCR specificity and stereotypy”).
80 Avner Schlessinger and others, “Epitome: Database of Structure-Inferred 
Antigenic Epitopes” (2006) 34 Nucleic Acids Res S1, D777; Randi Vita and others, 
“The Immune Epitope Database 2.0” (2010) 38 Nucleic Acids Res S1, D854.
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information on computationally inferred binding sites from immune receptor 
sequence data.81 Given that validation studies confirming the binding specific-
ity of an immune receptor are difficult and take time, computational techniques 
such as these are likely to both produce more data related to AIRR-seq projects 
and to make the original raw sequences increasingly valuable.
Broadly speaking, AIRR-seq data is thus of two types: (1) “raw” sequence 
information, typically in the file format FASTQ that enumerates the string of 
nucleotide sequences from a single sequencing project; and (2) what we refer 
to as “follow-on” information about that sequence data: Information concern-
ing the pairing of immune receptor chains; inferred antigen specificity; data 
on the “populations” or “clones” of certain B or T cells; or other functional 
or descriptive information about the cells and immune receptors that have 
been sequenced. As we detail in this chapter, the protectability of raw versus 
follow-on AIRR data as trade secrets raises different sets of issues under the 
EU Trade Secrets Directive and for academic science.
3. THE EU TRADE SECRETS DIRECTIVE
Similar to intellectual property rights—such as patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks—trade secrets protect economically valuable, secret information.82 
Until recently, trade secrecy law in the EU was a matter entirely for each 
individual Member State, with an additional patchwork of legal protections 
such as unfair competition, contract, and criminal laws.83 There had been no 
harmonized EU definition of a “trade secret”; nor did the European Union have 
a harmonized protection system for trade secrets.84
This changed recently with the EU Directive on the Protection of Undisclosed 
Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful 
Acquisition, Use and Disclosure.85 The Directive, following a proposal from 
the European Commission, was finally adopted by the European Parliament 
and the European Council on June 8, 2016, aimed at standardizing the national 
laws in EU Member States against the unlawful acquisition, disclosure, and 
use of trade secrets.86 The Directive also establishes a harmonized definition of 
“trade secret” and makes uniform the responsibilities of trade secrets holders 
81 Schlessinger and others (n 80) D777; Vita and others (n 80) D854.
82 Michael Risch, “Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?” (2007) 11 Marquette Intell 
Prop L Rev 1; Mark A Lemley, “The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP 
Rights” (2008) 61 Stan L Rev 311.
83 EU Trade Secrets Directive, preamble ¶ 6.
84 Ibid ¶ 10.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
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to guard their information.87 The Directive is not self-executing, however; 
Member States were required to bring into force the laws and administra-
tive provisions necessary to comply with the Directive by June 9, 2018.88 
Remarkably, only the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Slovakia transposed 
the Directive by this deadline.89 Since then, however, 23 Member States have 
transposed the Directive, in one form or another, into national law.90
Perhaps the principal achievement of the EU Trade Secrets Directive is 
its establishment of a harmonized definition of “trade secrecy,” as well as 
common measures aimed at preventing the wrongful disclosure of confidential 
commercial information.91 Regarding the definition of “trade secrecy,” the 
Trade Secrets Directive largely borrows from Article 39 of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), first ratified 
in 1994.92 Like Article 39 of TRIPS, Article 2 of the Trade Secrets Directive 
defines a trade secret as any information that is “secret,” has “commercial 
value because it is secret,” and “has been subject to reasonable steps under the 
circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep 
it secret.”93 “Secret,” under the Trade Secrets Directive, is further defined as 
“not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, 
generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that 
normally deal with the kind of information in question.”94
This definition is extraordinarily broad and leaves wide room for interpreta-
tion. For example, the extent of the notions of “generally known” and “readily 
accessible” is not entirely clear. Nor is it clear what it means to have taken 
“reasonable steps” to keep information secret. Past practices in individual 
Member States in the EU—with different requirements—may not necessar-
ily be a good guide for future practice. Much will have to be determined in 
due course through judgments by the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”). 
Nonetheless, according to the recitals to the Directive, the definition is meant 
to cover any information where the secret holder has both a legitimate interest 
87 Ibid, preamble ¶ 10.
88 Ibid, art 19(1).
89 Will Smith and Robert Williams, “Implementation of the Trade Secrets Directive 
– The Deadline Has Passed!” (June 11, 2018) www .twobirds .com/ en/ news/ articles/ 
2018/ global/ implementation -of -the -trade -secrets -directive -the -deadline -has -passed 
accessed June 10, 2018 (archived at https:// perma .cc/ B62Q -ZVJB).
90 See National transposition measures communicated by the Member States 
https:// eur -lex .europa .eu/ legal -content/ EN/ NIM/ ?uri = CELEX: 32016L0943 accessed 
Oct 16, 2019 (archived at https:// perma .cc/ W5RR -JAJK).
91 EU Trade Secrets Directive, art 2; Ibid art 4.
92 Ibid, art 2.1.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid, art 2.1(a).
Jacob S. Sherkow and Timo Minssen - 9781788973342
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/19/2020 11:13:53AM by emma.penton@e-elgar.co.uk
via AUTHOR COPY - NOT TO BE POSTED IN AN OPEN ONLINE REPOSITORY
AIRR data under the EU Trade Secrets Directive 249
in keeping the information confidential and a legitimate expectation that such 
confidentiality will be preserved.95
While the preservation of trade secrets tends to involve contracts, for 
example nondisclosure agreements among collaborators, enforcing them 
requires litigation.96 Under the Trade Secrets Directive, the cause of action for 
“infringement” is a claim to misappropriation, “such as theft, unauthorized 
copying, economic espionage, [the] breach of confidentiality requirements,” 
or any other method contrary to honest commercial practices.97 The Directive 
also includes the potential for third party liability for those who obtain trade 
secrets from unscrupulous parties. The Directive proscribes use or disclosure 
of a trade secret by a person who knew, or should have known, that the trade 
secret was obtained from someone using it or disclosing it unlawfully.98 In 
addition, unlike other jurisdictions, including the United States, the Directive 
establishes liability for producing, offering, or placing on the market “infring-
ing goods,” if the defendant knew or should have known that the trade secret 
was used unlawfully in their manufacture.99 In other words, it enables an action 
against persons further down the supply chain, even if they have no knowledge 
of the confidential information itself.
The Directive also provides defenses to these claims. One can defend 
against claims of misappropriation if the information was lawfully obtained. 
As defined by the Trade Secrets Directive, this includes independent discov-
ery, reverse engineering of publicly available products, discovery pursuant 
to a license, observation of the item in public use or on public display, or 
derivation from published literature.100 This also includes boundary situations, 
where the secret was nonetheless obtained from the secret holder otherwise “in 
conformity with honest commercial practices.”101
Since many of the concepts in the Trade Secrets Directive are not concretely 
defined, the CJEU will, in all likelihood, need to interpret them. The Directive 
further protects “whistleblowers” who disclose trade secrets to reveal miscon-
duct, wrongdoing, or illegal activity for the purpose of protecting the general 
public interest.102 This protection is extended irrespective of whether the 
trade secret disclosure is in confidence.103 In these senses, the Trade Secrets 
95 Ibid, preamble ¶ 1.
96 Ibid, preamble ¶ 24.
97 Ibid, preamble ¶ 4.
98 Ibid, art 4.
99 Ibid, art 4.5.
100 Ibid, art 3.
101 Ibid, art 3(1)(d).
102 Ibid, art 5.
103 Ibid.
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Directive makes trade secrets somewhat unlike traditional forms of intellectual 
property,104 and the Directive itself makes clear in recitals 1 to 3 and 39 that 
trade secret protection should be differentiated from traditional intellectual 
property rights.105 What exactly this entails is not entirely clear, and it remains 
to be seen how Member States’ legislatures and courts, including possibly the 
CJEU, will interpret the Directive for new technologies.
4. SHARING AIRR-SEQ DATA AND TRADE 
SECRETS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
AIRR-seq data is at its most robust when it is shared among researchers and 
annotated.106 Researchers can use others’ data to pair together immune receptor 
chains from the same B or T cell, annotate sequences for antigen specificity, 
and use the data in the development of recombinant immune receptors.107 
Sharing also allows outside researchers to validate the results of prior sequenc-
ing efforts, an important task in ensuring the reproducibility of results.108 But 
the sharing of AIRR-seq data practiced by academic researchers complicates 
efforts by commercial developers to protect aspects of the underlying data as 
trade secrets.109 This Part describes the norms and practices that researchers 
employ in sharing AIRR-seq data and several aspects of that data that may 
nonetheless be protectable under the Trade Secrets Directive as follow-on data.
4.1 Sharing Norms and Practices of AIRR-seq Data
AIRR researchers typically deposit their AIRR-seq data in a variety of 
public archives managed by government research agencies.110 In Europe, the 
European Bioinformatics Institute manages the European Nucleotide Archive 
104 Ibid, preamble ¶ 2.
105 Ibid, preamble ¶ 39.
106 Rubelt and others (n 13) 1275.
107 Sai T Reddy and others, “Monoclonal Antibodies Isolated Without Screening 
by Analyzing the Variable-Gene Repertoire of Plasma Cells” (2010) 28 Nat Biotech 
965; Dekosky and others (n 22) 166; Anastasios Spiliotopoulos and others, “Sensitive 
Recovery of Recombinant Antibody Clones After Their in silico Identification Within 
NGS Datasets” (2015) 420 J Immunological Methods 50.
108 Github, Recommendations from the AIRR Common Repository Working 
Group (2017) https:// github .com/ airr -community/ common -repo -wg/ blob/ master/ 
recommendations .md accessed June 1, 2018 (archived at http:// perma .cc/ 6F9L 
-WWT2).
109 EU Trade Secrets Directive, art 2.1.
110 Georgiou and others (n 49) 163; Breden and others (n 7) 1; Rubelt and others (n 
13) 1275.
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(ENA), a repository for “the world’s nucleotide sequencing information, 
covering raw sequencing data, sequence assembly information and functional 
annotation.”111 GenBank, a service of the U.S. National Institutes of Health, 
compiles information from the ENA and similar U.S. and Japanese efforts.112 
In addition, because HTS data tend to be more complex than traditional 
methods, the Sequence Read Archive serves as a worldwide bank of HTS data 
produced in the FASTQ format, specifically.113 All of these databases are pub-
licly available; they can be accessed by anyone with virtually no restrictions.114
Like public deposit, AIRR researchers often share data among them-
selves without restrictions. Nondisclosure agreements—so important for 
trade secrecy—are virtually unheard of among academic researchers. AIRR 
researchers have many reasons to share their data openly among themselves. 
The higher-ranked scientific journals, including Nature and Science, often 
require the deposit of sequence data as a condition of publication;115 journal 
editors’ requirements are perhaps one of the strongest influences on scientific 
practices.116 Open sharing and public deposit of AIRR-seq data also sends 
strong signals to researchers’ peers that the sequencing methods and proto-
cols met community standards and are otherwise of good quality.117 Sharing 
also comports with many researchers’ senses of scientific communalism, the 
Mertonian norm of common ownership of research products and data.118 Many 
researchers further see the sharing and deposit of AIRR-seq data as fulfilling 
their obligations to the public at large, stemming from their funding by public 
agencies.119 In short, AIRR researchers openly share and deposit their data 
because doing so aligns with academic norms and scientific practices.
For this reason, members of the AIRR Community have developed the 
Minimum Information AIRR standard, or MiAIRR, “a community-based 
111 European Molecular Biology Laboratory – European Bioinformatics Institute 
(EMBL-EBI), “European Nucleotide Archive” www .ebi .ac .uk/ ena accessed June 1, 
2018.
112 National Center for Biotechnology Information, “GenBank Overview” www 
.ncbi .nlm .nih .gov/ genbank/ accessed 1 June 2018.
113 National Center for Biotechnology Information, “SRA” www .ncbi .nlm .nih .gov/ 
sra accessed June 1, 2018.
114 Sources at nn 111–113.
115 Mark Blaxter et al, ‘Reminder to Deposit DNA Sequences’ (2016) 352 Science 
780; Steven L Salzberg, “Databases: Reminder to Deposit DNA Sequences” (2016) 533 
Nature 179.
116 Stephen M Maurer, Self-Governance in Science (Cambridge University Press 
2017) 17 19.
117 Rubelt and others (n 13) 1275.
118 Merton (n 18); Breden and others (n 7) 3–4.
119 Rubelt and others (n 13) 1277.
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standard for the reporting of experimental results” concerning AIRR-seq 
data.120 While the standard focuses on technical aspects of reporting—
requiring the production of certain datasets in specific formats—it is also 
designed to encourage AIRR researchers to maximally share their data.121 
The standard is designed in a way that enables incorporation into GenBank, 
the public repository of genetic sequence information hosted by the U.S. 
NIH.122 MiAIRR also allows AIRR-seq data to be transferred across platforms, 
enabling groups of researchers to access and use AIRR-seq data across labs 
and experiments.123 And lastly, the adopters envision that the establishment of 
MiAIRR will encourage scientific journals and funding agencies to adopt it, 
implicitly requiring the sharing of experimental AIRR-seq data.124 By creating 
a data standard, the AIRR Community has forged tools to advance the norms 
of open and free data sharing.
4.2 Protecting Aspects of AIRR-seq Data under the Directive
Under the Trade Secrets Directive, public sharing of AIRR-seq data, such as 
that through the MiAIRR standard without further restrictions, destroys any 
protectability in the underlying information itself.125 Trade secrets are only 
information that is, in fact, secret.126 But the commercial value of AIRR-seq 
data lies not in the raw data itself but in information derived from the data: 
what we term “follow-on information.” Elucidating this follow-on information 
is itself a difficult task and not readily apparent even from MiAIRR-compliant 
AIRR-seq data.127 This section discusses three, commercially important, types 
of follow-on information—receptor chain pairing, antigen specificity data, and 
recombinant immune receptor sequences—and how they should be treated 
under the Trade Secrets Directive even where the underlying AIRR-seq data 
is disclosed.
4.2.1 Receptor chain pairing
Because immune receptors are genetically coded as individual chains, it is 




123 Breden and others (n 7) 3–4.
124 Rubelt and others (n 13) 1275.
125 EU Trade Secrets Directive, art 2.
126 Ibid.
127 Rubelt and others (n 13) 1275.
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example, both the heavy and light chains of an antibody.128 Researchers have 
begun to solve this problem, however, by employing single cell sequencing.129 
By sequencing individual cells through droplet sequencing, scientists can 
ensure that any genetic immune receptor sequences consist of all of the chains 
constituting a single cell’s immune receptor.130 Separate sequences are then 
later annotated as having originated from a single immune cell—the implica-
tion being that they collectively constitute a set of chains from a single immune 
receptor.131
Pairing immune receptor chains is crucially important for understanding 
the specificity of a given immune receptor; frequently, all of an immune 
receptor’s chains are required to model an immune receptor’s CDR.132 Partial 
chains do little to help researchers understand to what an individual immune 
receptor binds.133 Further, knowledge of chain pairing has the potential to help 
researchers understand how the adaptive immune receptor repertoire evolves 
in response to infections—significant information for the development of 
vaccines.134
In this way, immune receptor chain pairing follow-on data has the potential 
to meet prongs (1)(a) and (1)(b) of the Directive’s definition trade secrets: 
Chain pairing data would not be “generally known among or readily acces-
sible” to other AIRR-seq researchers without this annotation;135 and the 
information, at least potentially, “has commercial value because it is secret.”136 
Obtaining immune receptor chain pairing information from unsorted data 
would be tremendously difficult,137 and freely releasing immune receptor chain 
pairing data to the larger research community would likely dissuade commer-
cial developers from working with any of the public sequences.138 Indeed, 
because patent protection for natural antibodies is becoming increasingly diffi-
128 Dekosky and others (n 22) 166.
129 Ibid; Friedensohn, Khan, and Reddy (n 58) 204–5. 
130 Dekosky and others (n 22) 166; Friedensohn, Khan, and Reddy (n 58) 204–5.
131 Dekosky and others (n 22) 166; Friedensohn, Khan, and Reddy (n 58) 204–5.
132 Dekosky and others (n 22) 167; Friedensohn, Khan, and Reddy (n 58) 206–7.
133 Anne Eugster and others, “Measuring T Cell Receptor and T Cell Gene 
Expression Diversity in Antigen-Responsive Human CD4+ T Cells” (2013) 400 J 
Immunological Methods 13–14.
134 Fischer (n 67) 19.
135 EU Trade Secrets Directive, art 1.
136 Ibid.
137 Dekosky and others (n 22) 166.
138 Panel Discussion, IP Issues in Data Sharing, Adaptive Immune Receptor 
Repertoire (AIRR) Community Meeting (4 Dec 2017) (Rockville, Maryland, USA) (IP 
Issues in Data Sharing).
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cult, both in Europe and the US, trade secrecy for immune receptor sequences 
is often thought of as the only intellectual protection available.139
To the degree that AIRR researchers wish to protect the commercial viabil-
ity of chain pairing, then, they would only need to take “reasonable steps under 
the circumstances … to keep it secret.”140 Practically, this would mean that 
MiAIRR-compliant disclosures of unsorted sequences would still be permis-
sible, while the particular annotations concerning chain-pairing could be kept 
sequestered. This would both preserve the economic viability of follow-on 
chain pairing data and meet the Trade Secrets Directive’s requirement that 
the information sought to be protected be kept secret. Researchers wishing 
to commercialize specific antibodies or TCRs could then share chain-pairing 
annotations under the cover of nondisclosure agreements. In some ways, the 
Trade Secrets Directive here provides clarity as to both what can be protected 
and what can continue to be reasonably shared.
To be clear, however, there is one possible technological complication: 
Inferred paired sequence chains from otherwise unsorted data.141 Researchers 
have begun to develop some techniques to computationally infer chain 
pairings from unsorted data.142 While the technology is, as of this writing, 
still rudimentary, it holds the promise to make valuable a large quantity of 
otherwise “loose” AIRR-seq data. But it would also constitute “reverse engi-
neering,” thus destroying the protectability of any paired-chain follow-on data 
that researchers would have otherwise liked to have kept secret.143 Whether 
such technology will come to pass such that chain-pairing information, even 
from unsorted data, is otherwise “readily accessible” remains to be seen—and 
is likely part of a larger story of reverse engineering technology outstripping 
engineers’ abilities to sequester trade secrets.144 But for now researchers can 
be confident that disclosing unpaired AIRR-seq, MiAIRR data will still allow 
139 Amgen Inc v Sanofi (2017) 872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. USA); W Nicholson Price 
II and Arti K Rai, “Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and Innovation” 
(2015) 101 Iowa L Rev 1023; Theresa Gresl, Ulrich Storz, and Colin Sandercock, “An 
Update on Obtaining and Enforcing Therapeutic Antibody Patent Claims” (2016) 34 
Nat Biotech 1242.
140 EU Trade Secrets Directive, art 1.
141 Bryan Howie and others, “High-Throughput Pairing of T Cell Receptor α and β 
Sequences” (2015) 7 Sci Translational Med 301ra131.
142 Ibid.
143 EU Trade Secrets Directive, art 3(1).
144 Marie E Ceste and John C Doyle, “Reverse Engineering of Biological 
Complexity” (2002) 295 Science 1664; Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer, 
“The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering” (2002) 111 Yale LJ 1575; Colin 
Bradley and Bernadette Currie, “Advances in the Field of Reverse Engineering” (2005) 
2 Computer-Aided Design & Applications 697.
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them to protect as trade secrets any valuable chain-pairing information that 
comes with it.
4.2.2 Antigen specificity data
AIRR-seq data itself, even with chain-pairing, does not necessarily inform 
researchers which antigens bind to which immune receptors.145 To obtain such 
information, researchers often need to engage in time-consuming validation 
studies: Expressing any immune receptors of interest in cultures of cells, iso-
lating the immune receptors themselves, and then measuring which ones bind 
to an antigen of interest.146 In some instances—if, for example, the sampled 
cells have been collected from a patient with a known infection—antigen 
specificity can be inferred: Sets of immune receptors produced at significantly 
higher volumes are likely to be specific to an antigen related to the infection.147 
But in most cases, the antigen specificity of any given AIRR sequence, stand-
ing alone, is a mystery.148
Some recent work by AIRR researchers, such as Lindsay Cowell at the 
University of Texas Southwestern and others, has begun to attempt to compu-
tationally infer antigen specificity from gene sequence data.149 By assigning 
a biochemical “score” to given stretches of DNA sequences, researchers can 
zero in on the physical structure of the resulting immune receptor and predict 
to which antigen the immune receptor is likely to bind.150 Accurate analogies 
are hard to come by—but the technique is, perhaps, akin to using the sound 
made by a key fitting into a lock to predict the shape of both the lock and the 
key. The technique can be medically powerful, too. In some circumstances, 
it can be used to accurately diagnose patients exhibiting symptoms of two 
closely related diseases—such as two variations of multiple sclerosis.151 At the 
same time, the power of the technology is—to date—limited. Computationally 
inferred antigen specificity data still must be validated by experiment, and the 
system still needs to be trained on “known” samples—samples derived from 
patients with known illnesses, for example.152
145 Rubelt and others (n 13) 1275.
146 Jennifer Bordeaux and others, “Antibody Validation” (2010) 48 Biotechniques 
197.
147 Schlessinger and others (n 80) D777; Vita and others (n 80) D854.
148 Schlessinger and others (n 80) D777; Vita and others (n 80) D854.
149 Jared Ostmeyer and others, “Statistical Classifiers for Diagnosing Disease 
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Consequently, this information, like chain-pairing data, is clearly “follow-on 
data” arising from the interpretation of larger AIRR-seq datasets. And it, too, is 
likely to fit within the Trade Secrets Directive’s definition of a “trade secret.” 
Antigen specificity—without more information about the patient source of the 
data or use of computational inference techniques—would not be “generally 
known” among AIRR researchers. It would also have significant commercial 
value to developers interested in developing predictive diagnostics using 
immune receptor sequence data.153 And the data could easily be subjected 
to reasonable steps to keep it secret. Nor does it seem that sequestering 
antigen specificity data violates any of the norms of AIRR-seq data sharing 
or the MiAIRR standard. Researchers could still freely share the underlying 
AIRR-seq data itself with others without disclosing its antigen specificity. And 
there is nothing in the MiAIRR standard that appears to compel the disclosure 
of antigen specificity even if known. Conceiving of antigen specificity data as 
protectable follow-on data, even if derived from publicly available MiAIRR 
datasets, seems to comport with both the purposes of the Trade Secrets 
Directive as well as scientific practices.
4.3 Recombinant Immune Receptors
Perhaps the most commercially significant follow-on information derived 
from AIRR-seq data is the development of “recombinant” immune receptors—
immune receptors, or fragments of immune receptors, that are then further 
modified, or “recombined,” to have an enhanced or superlative effect relative 
to the underlying “natural” sequence.154 Recombinant immune receptors are 
critical in the development of vaccines and other therapies. They allow devel-
opers to modulate the binding affinity between a given immune receptor and 
its antigen; to develop immune receptors that bind more specifically to par-
ticular antigens than their native versions; to bind to certain areas of an antigen 
relative to others; and to recombine—or “fuse”—immune receptors with other 
proteins to give them functions they did not otherwise possess.155 There are 
other potential applications as well.156
Researchers and commercial developers use AIRR-seq data to create 
recombinant immune receptors in a variety of ways. Targeted mutagenesis is 
one particular technique: Researchers iteratively “mutate,” or change, certain 
153 Ilan Kirsch, Marissa Vignali, and Harlan Robins, “T‐Cell Receptor Profiling in 
Cancer” (2015) 9 Molecular Oncology 2063.
154 Robinson (n 11) 172.
155 Daniel M Czajkowsky and others, “Fc‐Fusion Proteins: New Developments and 
Future Perspectives” (2012) 4 EMBO Molecular Med 1015.
156 Robinson (n 11) 175–6.
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sequences along the immune receptors’ chains to produce a certain effect, such 
as a stronger binding affinity to a particular antigen.157 Directed evolution is 
yet another technique, where researchers intentionally create small, random 
mutations in sequences of interest, and continually screen the products of their 
work until they achieve a particular result.158
Under any method, however, researchers are left with a sequence that is 
often subtly different from the original sequence—and one that would have 
neither been predictable nor readily apparent from the natural sequence 
itself.159 It is often this sequence itself—the recombinant sequence—that is of 
particular commercial value.160 To date, several commercial companies have 
been established on the foundation of recombinant immune receptor sequences 
derived from AIRR-seq data.161
Protecting the commercial viability of these sequences remains important 
for commercial developers.162 To that end, it seems to be clear that the dis-
closure of underlying AIRR-seq data would not upend trade secrecy for any 
recombinant sequences derived from it. The AIRR-seq data from which any 
recombinant sequence is derived is not the same as the sequence information 
produced by commercial developers. Thus, disclosure of the underlying 
AIRR-seq data would not, as a matter of law, make public any recombinant 
sequences sought to be protected. Further, the recombinant sequences would 
neither be known nor readily accessible simply based on the disclosure of 
the underlying sequence itself.163 In the case of targeted mutagenesis, while 
researchers may very well have an intuition of which sequences would be 
ideally modified, it would not be clear what those modifications were or 
whether they would actually work to produce the effect sought. And as for 
directed evolution, because the process is, essentially, random, predicting 
sequence variations ahead of time is highly unlikely.
In these cases, researchers seeking to protect, as trade secrets, recombinant 
immune receptor sequences should not fear the disclosure of the underlying 
AIRR-seq data from which they derive. This leaves researchers free to dis-
close largescale AIRR datasets, even under public sharing protocols such as 
157 Tomoyuki Igawa and others, “Engineering the Variable Region of Therapeutic 
IgG Antibodies” (2011) 3 mAbs 243.
158 Yi Li and others, “Directed Evolution of Human T-cell Receptors with Picomolar 
Affinities by Phage Display” (2005) 23 Nat Biotech 349.
159 Ibid.
160 IP Issues in Data Sharing (n 138).
161 Corbeau Biotech, LLC (Nashville, Tennessee, USA); Oxford BioTherapeutics 
(Abingdon, UK); Symphogen (Ballerup, Denmark).
162 IP Issues in Data Sharing (n 138).
163 Ibid.
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MiAIRR, without losing otherwise valuable protection to follow-on infor-
mation. Recombinant sequences, in this way, seem to best comport with the 
ideals of the Trade Secrets Directive, to both promote the “dissemination of 
knowledge and information” and “protect access to, and exploit, knowledge 
that is valuable … and not widely known.”164
5. THE TRADE SECRETS DIRECTIVE AND 
GENETIC DATA SHARING
While the issues surrounding trade secrecy and follow-on AIRR-seq data 
are themselves worthy of exploration, they also shed light on several other 
quandaries related to trade secrets and the disclosure of scientific information. 
They inform us about the dichotomous nature of trade secrets versus patent 
protection. Because the election of secrecy and patent protection are mutu-
ally exclusive, the current absence of robust patent protection for AIRR-seq 
provides a natural experiment, of sorts, regarding the value of trade secrecy 
for scientific information. The issues concerning trade secrecy and follow-on 
AIRR-seq data also highlight some of the difficulties regarding the disclo-
sure and protection of other largescale datasets in Europe, such as clinical 
trials. Lastly, the issues above are informative about protecting diagnostic 
technologies—underlying technologies that create the follow-on information 
sought to be protected in the first instance. Whether follow-on AIRR-seq will 
be protected by trade secrets under the Trade Secrets Directive, and the extent 
to which this may be the case, will likely be informative for these other areas 
as well.
5.1 Trade Secrecy vs Patent Protection
The importance of trade secrets in follow-on AIRR-seq data arises, in part, 
due to the lack of available patent protection. Patent protection for genetic 
sequences is, in many instances, suboptimal.165 Given advances in HTS 
technology, patent protection is unlikely to compel the elucidation of genetic 
sequence technology.166 It is unclear whether HTS technologies, like AIRR-seq, 
would even infringe genetic sequence patents.167 And gene sequence patents 
164 EU Trade Secrets Directive, preamble 3; Ibid 1.
165 Robert Cook-Deegan and Christopher Heaney, “Patents in Genomics and Human 
Genetics” (2010) 11 Ann Rev Genomics Human Genetics 383.
166 Jacob S Sherkow and Ryan Abbott, “Fortune and Hindsight: Gene Patents’ 
Muted Effect on Medical Practice” (2018) 126 Br Med Bull 37.
167 Ibid.
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are, for a variety of reasons, difficult to enforce.168 But AIRR-seq data seems 
to demonstrate that an absence of patent protection may channel researchers 
interested in protecting valuable sequences toward trade secrecy.169 Whether 
protection as trade secrets for AIRR-seq related data is ever enforced (as 
opposed to merely kept as de facto secrets) remains unclear.170 But AIRR-seq 
data seems to provide a case study of the disclosure tradeoffs between patents 
and trade secrecy.
This tradeoff arises from the dichotomous nature of trade secrets and 
patents. In the classical account, patents encourage scientific disclosure by 
giving inventors ex post protectable rights to the inventions disclosed.171 The 
act of disclosure itself, therefore, does not destroy the economic value of 
the shared information.172 Because trade secrets are antithetical to patents, 
however, inventors must choose beforehand whether to protect their informa-
tion through either patents or trade secrets—they cannot choose both.173
Several legal shifts, in both Europe and the United States, have curtailed the 
availability of patents for genetic sequences and other data-driven inventions. 
First, a series of three US Supreme Court decisions delivered from 2012 to 
2014 created enormous legal uncertainty as to whether genetic data, as well 
as data and algorithm-based technologies, are considered patentable subject 
matter.174 These have been implemented at the USPTO with the adoption of 
several important “guidances” on examining claims related to genetic material, 
imposing increasingly strict limitations on the patentability of natural products 
and methods using laws of nature.175 While patents for genetic sequences are 
still granted in Europe, broad claims covering “naked” genetic sequences are 
no longer available in light of scientific advances in sequencing; such claims 
now often fail to meet traditional patentability requirements, such as novelty 
and inventive step.176 These developments, in combination with stricter guide-
168 Ibid.
169 IP Issues in Data Sharing (n 138).
170 Ibid.
171 Jeanne C Fromer, “Patent Disclosure” (2009) 94 Iowa L Rev 539, 548.
172 Ibid.
173 Alan Devlin, “The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law” (2010) 
23 Harv JL & Tech 401, 417–18.
174 Bilski v Kappos [2010] 561 U.S. 593 (S. Ct.) (U.S.); Mayo Collaborative Servs 
v Prometheus Labs [2012] 566 U.S. 66 (S. Ct.) (U.S.); Alice Corp v CLS Bank Int’l 
[2014] 134 S Ct 2347 (U.S.).
175 USPTO, Nature-Based Products (2014) www .uspto .gov/ sites/ default/ files/ 
documents/ mdc _examples _nature -based _products .pdf accessed June 3, 2018 (archived 
at https:// perma .cc/ LKB4 -Q7HG).
176 Timo Minssen, “Patenting Human Genes in Europe and How It Compares to the 
US and Australia” in Duncan Matthews and Herbert Zech (eds), Research Handbook 
on Intellectual Property and the Life Sciences (Edward Elgar 2017) 26–39.
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lines on the application of patent criteria and the absence of sufficient parallel 
protection in the United States, often make reliance on traditional patent strat-
egies unattractive.177 This is one of the primary reasons why AIRR researchers 
rarely, if ever, seek patent protection for valuable immune receptor sequences 
and may rather be inclined to focus on trade secret protection.
Trade secrecy law has also become increasingly harmonized—making it an 
increasingly attractive form of worldwide IP protection.178 This is, of course, 
the purpose of the Trade Secrets Directive: “to ensure … a sufficient and con-
sistent level of civil redress” in the EU. But the United States has also recently 
passed its version of the Trade Secrets Directive, the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act—a federal law largely viewed as supplanting (although not explicitly so) 
a prior regime of individual trade secrecy laws in all 50 US states.179 The rise 
of AIRR-seq data, beginning in 2009 and continuing into the present, parallels 
these legal developments: As the AIRR research community has grown, so has 
the international harmonization of trade secrecy law. Coupled with the absence 
of patent protection, international developers of AIRR-seq follow-on data can 
take increasing solace in trade secrecy as both an adequate and uniform form 
of IP protection.
Lastly, de jure protection of trade secrets is substantially easy to obtain—
like copyright, trade secrecy protection comes into existence at the moment of 
creation, without any particularized examination process.180 By extension, this 
means that trade secrets that would otherwise fall foul of various patentability 
requirements—such as proving an “inventive step” or “industrial applica-
tion”—can still be protected without an application or other administrative 
formalities. This absence of a requirement for a trade secret to demonstrate 
any statutory requirements before qualifying for protection makes trade secrets 
cheap, easy, and flexible. This, too, is an attractive option for AIRR-seq 
follow-on data, created rapidly, sometimes en masse, and without the immedi-
ate knowledge of the full value of follow-on information. Above all, AIRR-seq 
data teaches that, in the absence of patent protection, trade secrecy may be an 
attractive option for economically valuable follow-on data.
177 Sherkow and Abbott (n 166) 2.
178 Anand B Patel and others, “The Global Harmonization of Trade Secret Law: 
The Convergence of Protections for Trade Secret Information in the United States and 
European Union” (2016) 83 Def Counsel J 472.
179 EU Trade Secrets Directive, preamble ¶10.
180 Neil Wilkof, “The Cost of Trade Secrets: Don’t Overlook the Psychological 
Price Being Paid” (2017) 12 J Intell Prop L & Practice 715, 715.
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5.2 Clinical Trial Data Disclosure and Trade Secrets
Data from clinical trials—largescale, human studies conducted by therapeutic 
developers to obtain regulatory approval—remain some of the most valuable 
data in the world.181 Almost universally, commercial developers have pro-
tected their clinical trial data as secrets.182 Somewhat like the tension surround-
ing disclosing raw AIRR-seq data, the worry behind releasing clinical trial data 
to the public is that the disclosure would obviate protection for any follow-on 
information derived from it.183 This even includes cases concerning “negative” 
data—results of an examined therapeutic development having no beneficial 
clinical effect or no statistically significant effect at all.184 Like AIRR-seq data, 
the perceived value to follow-on information produces friction to sharing raw 
information.
Several jurisdictions have responded to these difficulties in disclosure by 
proposing numerous regulations mandating, or strongly encouraging, the 
sharing of clinical trial information.185 In the European Union this is governed 
by Regulation No 536/2014, On Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for 
Human Use (the Clinical Trial Regulation).186 The Clinical Trial Regulation 
requires companies to submit clinical trial data to a publicly accessible EU 
database.187 At the same time, the Regulation provides that a portion of the 
information can be withdrawn on the grounds of “protecting commercially 
confidential information.”188 While the Regulation has had its critics, it has 
largely been lauded as a compromise between disclosure and secrecy of com-
mercially valuable information.189
Several recent rulings by the CJEU interpreting the Clinical Trial Regulation 
align well with distinctions between basic scientific information, such as raw 
AIRR-seq data, and follow-on information. In Pari Pharma v EMA, for 
181 Rebecca S Eisenberg, “The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy” (2006) 13 
Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 345.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid, 347 n 5.
185 Michelle M Mello and others, “Preparing for Responsible Sharing of Clinical 
Trial Data” (2013) 369 New Engl J Med 1651.
186 Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 April 2014 on Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use, and Repealing 
Directive 2001/20/EC [2014] OJ R158/1 (Clinical Trial Regulation).
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
189 Sabine Atzor, Surendra Gokhale, and Michael Doherty, “Will the EU Clinical 
Trials Regulation Support the Innovative Industry in Bringing New Medicines Faster to 
Patients?” (2013) 27 Pharm Med 75.
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example, the CJEU upheld the EMA’s decisions to release documents from 
clinical trials under its older “Transparency Regulation.”190 While the Court 
rejected the companies’ objections to the data’s release, it also provided 
a roadmap for future efforts of nondisclosure of clinical trial data context. 
Specifically, the CJEU allowed the nondisclosure of “new scientific con-
clusions” or “an inventive strategy” derived from clinical data.191 In PTC 
Therapeutics International v EMA, the CJEU similarly required the disclosure 
of a “clinical study report” (“CSR”)—a summary of clinical trial data—on the 
grounds that the CSR was not follow-on information, but coextensive with the 
underlying data itself, the “latter being accessible to the public and containing 
data emanating directly from the report at issue.”192
Recently, however, this interpretation of the Clinical Trial Regulation has 
been challenged. In the course of an appeal of PTC Therapeutics International 
v EMA, the Advocate General recommended that the court set aside the CJEU’s 
judgment and refer the matter back to the General Court.193 The Advocate 
General’s recommendation stemmed from the fact that the information dis-
closed in a CSR—even if coextensive with that given to the EMA—“would … 
be of considerable advantage to any potential competitor … [providing] insight 
into the working methods, methodologies, etc. … perhaps even to the point of 
providing a ‘road map’ for future [marketing authorization] applications—not 
least in a commercial environment which is exceptionally competitive.”194 
Whether the CJEU will adopt the Advocate General’s analysis—despite its 
earlier precedent—remains unclear as of this writing.
The tension highlighted by the Advocate General’s opinion mirrors some 
advantages and disadvantages of the Regulation’s approach. As one example, 
the case of AIRR-seq data and recombinant sequences gives some credence 
190 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 [2001] OJ L145/43; see also Case T-235/15, Pari 
Pharma v EMA [2018] CJEU 65 (in relation to the disclosure of similarity and superior-
ity reports on an orphan medicine, prepared by the Committee for Medicinal Products 
for Human use (CHMP)); Case T-718/15, PTC Therapeutics Intl v EMA [2018] CJEU 
66 (on the disclosure of a clinical study report); Case T-729/15, MSD Animal Health 
Innovation and Intervet Intl v EMA [2018] CJEU 67 (regarding five toxicology study 
reports for a veterinary medicine).
191 Pari Pharma (n 190) at para 154. At the same time, the Court imposed a high 
standard of proof on companies seeking to prevent disclosure by requiring that they 
“describe in specific terms the professional and commercial importance of the infor-
mation … and the utility of that information for other undertakings which are liable 
to examine and use it subsequently,” for example “to show specifically and actually 
how, once the documents have been disclosed, competitors would be able to enter the 
market.” Ibid.
192 PTC Therapeutics (n 190) at para 89.
193 Case C-175/18 P, PTC Therapeutics Intl v EMA [2019] Op Adv Gen 709.
194 Ibid at para 76.
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to developers’ arguments that negative data is, too, commercially valuable. 
Negative clinical trial data, as much as positive clinical trial data, can lead to 
‘readily available’ commercially valuable information about the direction of 
therapeutic development: improvements for compositions, new medical uses, 
and successful dosage regimens, for example.195 This can be contrasted, for 
example, with the concerns surrounding the release of native versus recombi-
nant sequences of immune receptors. Because recombinant sequences would 
not be readily available from their native cousins, it makes little sense to 
protect the latter as trade secrets; but because drug development information 
can, in some instances be readily available from negative trial data, it does 
make sense to protect the latter.
The Clinical Trial Regulation also provides a cautionary tale about Member 
State flexibility. The Trade Secrets Directive does, despite its unifying effect, 
allow Member States to provide for their provisions concerning enforcement 
that include the “public interest.” Given that different Member States are 
likely to have different views about this public interest provision, it may cow 
commercial developers into overextending their claims to secrecy—as was 
the case in PTC Therapeutics. If the effect of the Trade Secrets Directive is to 
provide a safe space for the disclosure of raw sequence information, the effect 
of the Clinical Trial Regulation’s amorphous “public interest” exemption may 
be the opposite.
5.3 Trade Secrecy, Disclosure, and Diagnostics
Follow-on AIRR-seq data, under the Trade Secrets Directive, may also be 
informative to best practices for the protection of genetic diagnostics—the 
tools used to create and interpret genetic data in the first instance. While 
patents for diagnostics have waned, trade secrecy for diagnostics is on the 
rise.196 This is problematic for several reasons: trade secrecy interferes with 
practitioners’ understanding of diagnostics’ outputs; it hides whether diag-
nostic results are reproducible; it risks public health.197 At the same time, 
information concerning how diagnostics arrive at the outputs they do and how, 
in other instances, they interpret those outputs often constitutes the principal 
commercial value of the diagnostic.
The treatment of AIRR-seq follow-on data suggests that follow-on infor-
mation can be kept secret while disclosing the raw AIRR-seq data. This 
195 Eisenberg (n 181) 347 n 5.
196 Robert Cook-Deegan and others, “The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing: 
Clinical Data as Trade Secrets?” (2012) 21 Eur J Human Genetics 585.
197 Ibid.
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parallels the disclosure of diagnostics inputs while keeping their outputs 
secret. This makes sense given that diagnostics must rely on interpretive 
software.198 Diagnostic platforms typically focus on largescale screening of 
genes, proteins, and metabolites, and derive value from their ability to dis-
tinguish between multitudes of diseases when paired with bespoke analytical 
software.199 As such, it is this analytical software that could represent valuable 
trade secrets.200 For example, a diagnostic device, although having a unique 
combination of patent-protected biomarkers, may only provide a meaningful 
diagnosis when paired with relevant software.201 This is akin to bioinformatics 
tools used to infer AIRR sequences, create chain pairs, or attempt to predict the 
binding affinity of immune receptors. If the follow-on AIRR-seq data is any 
guide, then best practices suggest protecting outputs rather than inputs.
6. OPEN QUESTIONS
Much like the CJEU’s future interpretation of the Trade Secrets Directive, the 
Directive’s applicability to AIRR-seq data leaves open a number of questions 
for further investigation. First, as the technology progresses, it is unclear how 
tenable the distinction between “raw” and “follow-on” data will remain. As 
this gap shrinks, it may very well be the case that disclosure of raw data to 
relevant “circles” of scientists may ultimately prevent the availability of trade 
secrecy protection on even follow-on data under the Trade Secrets Directive.202 
The commercial consequences of such an interpretation are unknown, as is 
whether this would encourage researchers to abandon disclosure of even basic 
AIRR-seq data.
Second, it is not entirely clear whether the protectability of raw data could 
also be challenged under the “commercial value” prong, especially given the 
Advocate General’s expansive interpretation of “commercial value” in another 
context under the Clinical Trial Regulation.203 As we have described above, 
the true commercial value of the raw data is normally first revealed during 
a follow-on process, that is, when skilled researchers routinely apply special-
ized algorithms to the raw AIRR-seq data. Here too, it could also be argued 
that the potential value, that is, the mere possibility of extracting such infor-
198 Rochelle C Dreyfuss and James P Evans, “From Bilski Back to Benson: 





202 See EU Trade Secrets Directive, art 2.1(a)–(c). 
203 PTC Therapeutics (n 190).
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mation from raw AIRR-seq data, would make any dataset valuable enough to 
fulfill the ‘commercial value’ prong. 
Third, if this view prevails, where raw data itself would be considered “com-
mercially valuable” under the Trade Secrets Directive, this may open the door 
to claims from universities regarding closing access without formal agree-
ments in place. Under some national regimes, some universities might even be 
obliged to pursue commercial strategies—a potential that, oddly, finds support 
in the Trade Secrets Directive itself, in Recital 1.204 Much will depend on the 
particular circumstances of each research project, but courts, lawyers and legal 
researchers, scientists, and universities will certainly have to consider such 
questions as the technology begins to become more robust and the CJEU, and 
national courts, begin to consider similar cases.
7. CONCLUSION
On the one hand, the EU Trade Secrets Directive attempts to reconcile two 
competing goals: the protection of commercially valuable information and 
the promotion of open innovation. On the other, certain stipulations, such as 
Recital 1 of the Preamble, would seem to suggest that even raw data may be 
valuable to noncommercial research institutions. Largescale genetic datasets, 
such as those created by AIRR sequencing, serve as one concrete case study of 
how both goals can—or cannot—be achieved. AIRR-seq data is enormously 
complex, costly to create, and difficult to interpret. Academic researchers, in 
turn, are usually bound to norms of open sharing of raw sequence data, which, 
in typical circumstances, would destroy any protection of the underlying data 
itself as being made public under the Directive. In light of this, the temptation 
to reorient these norms toward commercial enterprise might be strong. And in 
204 See EU Trade Secrets Directive, recital 1 of the preamble: “(1) Businesses and 
non-commercial research institutions invest in acquiring, developing and applying 
know-how and information which is the currency of the knowledge economy and pro-
vides a competitive advantage. This investment in generating and applying intellectual 
capital is a determining factor as regards their competitiveness and innovation-related 
performance in the market and therefore their returns on investment, which is the under-
lying motivation for business research and development. Businesses have recourse to 
different means to appropriate the results of their innovation-related activities when 
openness does not allow for the full exploitation of their investment in research and 
innovation. Use of intellectual property rights, such as patents, design rights or copy-
right, is one such means. Another means of appropriating the results of innovation is to 
protect access to, and exploit, knowledge that is valuable to the entity and not widely 
known. Such valuable know-how and business information, that is undisclosed and 
intended to remain confidential, is referred to as a trade secret.”
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an era where political and democratic norms are quickly dissolving, it is not 
entirely clear how binding and robust the norms of open science really are. 
But even if university norms and noncommercial scientific ideals of open 
sharing of raw sequence data prevail, the complexity of AIRR-seq data leaves 
an opening for the protection of commercially valuable follow-on information 
that arises from the interpretation of underlying data. Follow-on information of 
this sort includes pairing data of immune receptor chains, antigen specificity, 
and the development of recombinant proteins. In this way, the Trade Secrets 
Directive shows that—despite the conflicting goals of protectable secrecy and 
open innovation—it might be possible to develop open innovation platforms 
while allowing protection, and secrecy, for related information. Much will 
depend on the contextual traditions, (user-generated) standards, and habits of 
enforcement.
Viewed through this lens, this case study on AIRR-seq data under the Trade 
Secrets Directive is informative about other problems in the law concerning 
disclosure and secrecy: the tradeoff between patents and trade secrets, the 
sharing of proprietary clinical trial data, and the protection of genetic diagnos-
tics. AIRR-seq data shows that it is at least theoretically possible to simulta-
neously promote information sharing and reserve the most value for aspects 
of that information to encourage private development of new technologies. 
At the same time, trade secrets and traditional intellectual property rights will 
continue to be only one part of the equation reconciling the aspirations and 
opportunities of data sharing with the harsh realities of business and research 
competition in biopharmaceutical development. Successful sharing strategies 
will need to take into account other sui generis rights, such as data protection, 
regulatory exclusivities, and anticompetition laws—many of which are dis-
cussed in Chapter 14 of this book.
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